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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
W. R. YOUNG, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
ERNEST H. BARDSLEY, 
Impleaded Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAY H. BUCHANAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
This is an appeal by the defendant from an adverse 
judgment for $500 commission, $200 attorney's fee and 
costs, in an action brought by and on behalf of a licensed 
real estate salesman on a written contract of employment. 
The licensed and bonded real estate broker by or for 
whom the salesman was employed, or under whose authori-
ty the salesman worked, was impleaded as a party plain-
tiff to the action and the judgment runs in his favor for 
the use and benefit of the salesman, who, under the facts 
in the case, by reason of the terms of his employment by 
the broker, is the real party in interest. 
NO. 7844 
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The controlling facts in the case are not in conflict and 
are set out in appellant's brief. We have no quarrel with 
the appellant's statement of the facts. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS IS A CLEAR CASE WHERE THE SALESMAN 
HONESTLY EARNED THE PROMISED COMMISSION; 
THE ONLY QUESTION TO BE DECIDED IS WHETH^ 
ER UNDER THE LAW HE IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
IN THIS ACTION. 
That the salesman honestly earned the promised com-
mission is demonstrated by the facts. 
Buchanan hired Young to find a buyer for the Bu-
chanan home, the price to be $17,500, later reduced to 
$16,500, and promised in writing to pay a commission of 
$500 if the salesman were successful in his efforts. 
The contract (Ex. A) of hiring, being in writing, was 
in compliance with the Statute of Frauds, Sec. 33-5-4 (5), 
U. C. A. 1943. 
The contract gives the salesman an exclusive agency 
to sell for a period of six months from the date of its exe-
cution, which was June 12, 1949, and then goes on to stipu-
late that if Buchanan should sell the property within a pe-
riod of three months from the date of its expiration to any 
person to whom Young had previously offered it, then Bu-
chanan would pay the stated commission. 
Immediately after the contract was signed Young got 
busy interesting buyers. He offered the property to sev-
eral prospects, among the very first being Cecil King. King 
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was interested but said the price was too high (T. 13, 14, 
15, 19). 
Young promptly informed Buchanan of King's interest 
and of his statement regarding the price. 
Young continued to work on the sale of the property 
until the contract expired on December 12, 1949. And 
then, in January, 1950, which was after the contract had 
expired as as exclusive listing, Buchanan told Young to con-
tinue his efforts to find a buyer at $17,500; so Young did 
take other prospects down to look at the place, among them 
one Wegener, who was very much interested. About March 
1 to 4, Buchanan told Young to tell Wegener that the price 
was reduced to $16,500 (T. 21). 
Young thereupon communicated to King the informa-
tion that the price had been reduced to $16,500, and King 
said he would look at it (T. 22). 
Then Young took Wegener down to look at the prop-
erty, and King and his wife were there talking with the 
Buchanans (T. 27). 
It is not unreasonable to suggest that King made up 
his mind to buy when he saw that someone else was inter-
ested; for Buchanan sold the home to King, the parties 
dealing directly with each other and by-passing the sales-
man, for a cash price of $16,500, on the 17th day of Feb-
ruary, 1950, which is the date on the check given at the 
time of the sale. 
It is therefore apparent that Young brought this sel-
ler and buyer together, that it was through his efforts that 
Buchanan was able to sell his home at a price which was 
satisfactory to him. 
Young fully performed the services for which he was 
employed; Buchanan has reaped the benefits of Young's 
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services and has enjoyed the fruits of his contract. The 
sale was made within the stipulated time. 
In equity and good conscience, therefore, Young is en-
titled to his pay. 
The judgment in the case does equity and justice be-
tween the parties, and for that reason it should be affirmed, 
unless there be some impelling reason to be found in the 
statutes relating to real estate brokers and real estate sales-
men why it cannot be permitted to stand (Ch. 2, Title 82, 
U. C. A., 1943). 
n. 
THERE IS NO LEGAL REASON WHY THIS JUDG-
MENT CANNOT STAND. 
Bardsley was a licensed and bonded real estate broker 
and Young was a licensed real estate salesman under the 
laws of the State of Utah during 1949. They had an agree-
ment among themselves to the effect that Young was to 
pay all expenses of the broker business and was to be en-
titled to all the commissions on sales which he made. Bards-
ley himself did not wish to engage in the broker business 
that year, but he did want to keep his license in effect. It 
was necessary because of the provisions of the statutes that 
Young work for or under the direction of some licensed and 
bonded broker. There does not seem to be any reason 
whatever why they might not in these circumstances make 
the arrangement which they did make for payment of the 
expenses of the business and for the disposition of the com-
missions. Bardsley had a right to give Young all the com-
missions just as much as he had the right to pay Young a 
salary or a part of the commissions. What they did in this 
respect concerned no one but themselves. So far as the 
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public is concerned, and so far as the rights of any custo-
mer are concerned, these arrangements are wholly imma-
terial; for the public and the customers are protected by 
Bardsley's bond, regardless of how the broker and the sales-
man agreed to dispose of the earned commissions. 
The agreement between Bardsley and Young is a ma-
terial fact, however, upon one question in the case. That 
question relates to the proper or necessary party or parties 
plaintiff. 
Since the agreement provides that Young is to have 
all the commissions, it would seem that Young is the real 
party in interest and is the proper party to bring the ac-
tion. At the time the action was commenced Section 82-
2-18, which prohibits actions by licensed salesmen to collect 
commissions, was not on the books. It came into the pic-
ture in 1951. So there was no statute which in express lang-
uage prohibited the salesman from maintaining the action. 
But that statute was in effect when the case came on for 
trial. When the action was commenced the statutes did 
prohibit the salesman from accepting his commission di-
rectly from the customer. But it did seem to us that such 
prohibition did not apply to a case like this, where the cus-
tomer refused to pay any commission at all and where he 
by-passed the salesman and dealt directly with the pur-
chaser and there was no money to go to the broker except 
the commission. We therefore commenced the action in 
the name of Young alone, on the theory that he was the 
real and only party in interest because of the nature of his 
contract with Bardsley, the broker. 
During the course of the trial, however, this writer be-
came doubtful of the soundness of that position because 
the legislature by the amendment of the law in 1951 had 
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emphatically declared that salesmen should not have the 
right to sue. It did seem that such had been the legisla-
tive intent all along, and the amendment had been made to 
make definite and certain an intention which before had 
been only implicit in the statutes. So we asked and re-
ceived permission of the Court to implead Bardsley as a 
party plaintiff. 
It is necessary that he be a party, and, if a recovery is 
had, it is necessary that payment be made to him, because 
it would render Young liable to punishment as for a mis-
demeanor if he were to accept payment of the commission 
direct from Buchanan. But Bardsley's interest is nil be-
cause of his agreement with Young respecting the right to 
the commissions. 
The contract between Buchanan and Young is not il-
legal. Buchanan had a right to hire Young to sell the 
home. Young had a right to try to sell it and to accept the 
employment for he was licensed as a real estate salesman. 
What else is the license for but to authorize him to engage 
in the business of selling real estate? Buchanan had a right 
to promise to pay a commission for the services to be ren-
dered. Young had a right to receive a commission for sel-
ling it. The only requirement of the statutes in this regard 
is that Young must not accept his commission from the 
hands of the customer, but only through the licensed and 
bonded real estate broker. 
All parties concerned must be presumed to know the 
law. Certainly Bardsley and Young knew of this statutory 
requirement, for they both had obtained licenses under the 
provisions of Chapter 2, Title 82, U. C. A., 1943. So when 
the contract was made between Buchanan and Young, the 
latter knew he could not lawfully accept the commission 
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from the former; and Buchanan presumably knew it would 
be a criminal act for Young to accept the commission from 
him, but that it would have to be paid through the bonded 
broker for whom Young was employed as a salesman. 
It was not contrary to law for Buchanan to promise 
to pay Young a commission. The statute does not prohibit 
such a promise. It was not contrary to law for Young to 
accept a commission. It would not be illegal for Buchanan 
to pay the commission direct to Young, by which we mean 
to say it would be no crime on Buchanan's part for him to 
pay direct. The only criminal act involved arises when 
Young accepts the commission direct from the hands of 
Buchanan, and it is to avoid that result that it must be pre-
sumed that the parties to this contract intended the commis-
sion to go through the hands of Bardsley to Young. It will 
not be presumed that the parties intended any one to be-
come involved in criminal liability. A way was open to 
them to avoid such a result. That way was through the 
agency of the bonded broker. So it must be presumed that 
what they really meant to say, when the contract was writ-
ten, is that Buchanan would pay Young the commission, but 
that he would pay it through the agency of Bardsley, who 
was licensed and bonded to accept it from Buchanan and 
who was under contract to pay it over to Young. 
Buchanan may not have known that Young was work-
ing under Bardsley's license and bond, but he is presumed 
to know that he was working under some licensed and bon-
ded broker. So far as he was concerned, it matters not 
whether it was Bardsley or someone else; he wanted Young 
to sell the home and hired him to do so, knowing that he 
was protected as to Young's integrity by the bond of some 
broker; and knowing, furthermore, that if Young found 
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a buyer and a contract were to be closed, the closing agree-
ment would have to be made by a broker and the money, 
if not paid direct to the seller, would have to go through 
the trust funds of the broker. 
The contract does not require Buchanan to do any act 
which is prohibited by law; it does not require Young to 
do any act which is prohibited by law. It is therefore not 
illegal. 
The judgment does not require the doing of any act 
which is illegal on the part of anyone. The judgment re-
quires that Buchanan pay the commission and the attor-
ney's fee to Bardsley, who by law is entitled to receive it; 
and who, by reason of his arrangement with Young, is ob-
ligated to turn it over to the latter when received. Young 
is not prohibited by law from accepting the commission 
from Bardsley; in fact, that is the only place that he may 
look for it. 
If it had not been for the special contract or arrange-
ment under which Young, the salesman, was operating for 
Bardsley, the licensed and bonded broker, this contract be-
tween Buchanan and Young would probably be regarded 
as a contract between Buchanan and Bardsley; and in that 
case Bardsley would be the real and only party in interest, 
But because of the understanding between the broker and 
the salesman with regard to the expenses of the office and 
the commissions to be earned, the contract is in reality as 
well as in form between Buchanan and Young, the broker 
as a matter of fact appearing in the picture only as the in-
termediary through whom the commission may lawfully 
be paid. 
The thought is expressed in appellant's brief that this 
judgment is wrong because the contract had expired on 
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February 17, 1950, when the property was sold; and that 
Bardsley's license had not been renewed for the year 1950, 
hence Young's license was not in force. 
It is true that the contract had expired when the prop-
erty was sold. But the liability of Buchanan to pay the 
commission on any sale which he made within three months 
after the date of expiration had not expired. It continued 
for a full period of three months from December 12, 1949. 
The cause of action did not arise until February 17, 1950. 
It is true that Bardsley did not renew his broker's license 
for 1950, but Young did renew his salesman's license for 
that year, working for another licensed and bonded broker. 
We have no quarrel with the statutory regulations of 
real estate brokers and real estate salesmen. Our only con-
cern is to bring our actions in line with them, to learn and 
know what they require and to act accordingly. We are 
not prepared to believe that the legislature intended, when 
it adopted the regulatory statutes with which we are here 
concerned, to provide for a system of operations under which 
a salesman in Young's situation would be denied all remedy 
against the defendant. But such would be the result should 
the Court reverse this judgment. 
We respectfully submit that there is nothing morally 
or legally wrong with any act on the part of Bardsley or 
Young in respect to this transaction; that the statutes should 
be and can reasonably be construed and applied in such a 
manner as to require that this judgment be affirmed. 
We therefore respectfully submit that the judgment 
should be affirmed and that respondent be awarded his costs. 
DILWORTH WOOLLEY, 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Address: Manti, Utah. 
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